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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
RAY NAISBITT, Guardian Ad Litem
for DARRYL R. NAISBITT, a minor,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 8385

JOSEPH EGGETT,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Ray N aisbitt as guardian ad litem for Darryl R. N aisbitt, a minor, to recover
damages suffered by the minor when a sleigh on which
he was riding collided with the automobile of the defendant. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the
grounds that no actionable negligence had been shown
on the part of the defendant. The question presented
by this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in so
directing a verdict.
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STATEl\!ENT OF FACTS
This accident occurred on a curve where a road
designated as the Ranch Road intersects the Mueller Park
Road in the Mueller Park area southeast of the center
of Bountiful in Davis County, Utah (R. 1). The Mueller
Park Road extends in an easterly direction from Fourth
East Street in Bountiful toward the mountains east of
Bountiful (See diagram, Exhibit N). It travels generally uphill to point where the Ranch Road intersects it.
From that point on, Mueller Park Road continues on east
making a dip downhill. The Ranch Road extends to the
south and uphill from its intersection with the Mueller
Park Road for about 300 feet, where there is likewise
a dip and the Ranch Road goes down hill (Tr. 99). There
are a number of families who live on the Ranch Road
who must use the Mueller Park Road in getting to and
from their homes ( Tr. 104, 105). Mueller Park Road
is also used by the families living on that road, including
the defendant in this case (Tr. 170). Exhibits Hand C
are photographs looking east on Mueller Park Road and
show the dip in that road and the curve leading off into
the Ranch Road which is on the right hand side of the
pictures. Exhibits 1 and 2 show the same general scene.
The photographs, Exhibits Band F, were taken from the
Mueller Park Road looking around the curve and up the
Ranch ;Road. Exhibits D and G are pictures taken from
a different point on the Mueller Park Road looking up
the Ranch Road toward the dip in the Ranch Road. Exhibits A and E are taken from a point on the Ranch
Road looking around the curve and toward the Mueller

a
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·EX.: r.

Park Road. This accident occurred just around this curve
on the Mueller Park Road. Exhibit C, looking east on
the Mueller Park Road, and Exhibit E, taken from the
Ranch Road and looking toward the Mueller Park Road,
are reproduced in this brief for the convenience of the
Court.
In December of 1953, there had been a number of
snow storms and the roads were covered with snow (Tr.
53-101). A sign designating the road as a coasting lane
had been put at the entrance to the :Mueller Park Road on
Fourth East in Bountiful ( Tr. 53), and a Seth Williams
had been designated to supervise the sleigh riding on the
hill (Tr. 8). On the day of the accident, the defendant,
Joseph Eggett, who lived a block east of the Ranch
Road on the Mueller Park Road, got off work at eight
o'clock in the morning and was returning to his home
about nine o'clock (Tr. 159). As he got nearly to the
top of the hill on the Mueller Park Road, his car started
to quit, whereupon he turned it around and parked it
on the right hand side, the north side, in the vicinity of
the Ranch Road intersection with the front of the car
facing west (Tr. 160). Leaving the car in that position,
he walked home to his breakfast some short distance
further up the Mueller Park Road (Tr. 160).
On the same morning, the plaintiff, Darryl Richard
Naisbitt, had been playing basketball at Darryl's home
with his boy friend, Bruce Allen Litster (Tr. 108). At
about 10 :00 A.M. they took Darryl's sleigh and a sleigh
belonging to Darryl's brother and went over to the
Mueller Park Road (Tr. 109). There they met the third
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boy, Carlos Leland Litster, the brother of Bruce, at the
-bottom of the hill (Tr. 109). When they arrived, a road
scraper was scraping out an area at the bottom of the
hill and Seth Williams would not let them go up the road
(Tr. 110). At about 12:00 the road crew finished scraping and Seth Williams went home to lunch after telling
the boys that they could go up the hill (Tr. 112). Darryl
and Carlos took one sleigh and went about half way up
the hill and sleighed down and were waiting for Bruce,
who took the other sleigh, when a Mr. Grant Adams
Child came along (Tr. 112).
Grant Adams Child, who lived on the Ranch Road,
arrived at tl!e bottom of the hill or the Mueller Park Road
at about noon (Tr. 96). He was watching the children
and did not notice Darryl's sleigh, which had been left
in the middle of the road, until after his car had run over
it (Tr. 96). Apparently in an effort to make up to the
:boys for having run over their sleigh, he offered to give
. them a ride up the hill (Tr. 97). Seth Williams had
. _apparently left before he. arrived, as there was no one
. ~upervising -the boys at the time (Tr. 98). The Litster
-boys and Darryl climbed into the c;:tr and Mr. Child
took them up the Mueller Park Road to the Ranch Road
and then around the curve and up the Ranch Road about
300 feet to the point where the road dips off so that they
could get the maximum amount of coasting (Tr. 98).
When they got out of Mr. Child's car, Carlos Litster,
who was fifteen years of age at the time, got on the
sleigh first. Bruce Litster, who was thirteen years of age,
got on next, and Darryl, who was eleven at the time,
4
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got on the top. Darryl gave a push and the trio started
down the hill (Tr. 143). In the meantime, the defendant,
Joseph Eggett, had finished his breakfast and was returning to his car with the idea of taking it to be fixed.
As he walked down to the car, he met his brother, James
Lynn Eggett, age eleven, who had come to the area to
sleigh ride. The two of them walked down the hill to the
defendant's car. About the time they arrived at the car,
they saw Grant Child going up the road and both waved
to him (Tr. 162). Getting into his car, the defendant
found that the car would run with the front end fac~g
down hill and assumed that the difficulty must be in the
fuel pump (Tr. 162). Knowing that his wife wanted to
go down town to do some shopping, he decided to take her
with him and started backing the car up the hill toward
his home to pick up his wife (Tr. 162).
The defendant backed his car on the north side of the
highway and his brother walked along the south side pulling his sleigh and keeping about even with the side of
the car (Tr. 162). As the defendant approached the
Ranch Road turn he saw the sled with the three boys
come around the curve and immediately stopped his car
(Tr. 163). The boys were wide in their turn and struck
the back of his car (Tr. 163). He immediately got out of
his car and noticed Carlos standing up; Bruce sitting
down; and Darryl lying in the snow (Tr. 163). Darryl
had a cut over his eye and on his mouth (Tr. 163) and
the defendant decided to take him to the doctor rather
than to leave him on the hill. Bruce and Carlos got into
his car and he put Darryl into the car and then drove
5
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the three boys to the Bountiful Medical Center (Tr. 164).
On cross-examination Carlos Litster testified that
this was the first time that winter he had gone up the
Ranch Road to sleigh ride ( Tr. 148). He testified that
Seth Williams would usually take them to a point known
as Sandy, a little 1nore than a block from the top of the
hill in his jeep (Tr. 148), and stop the cars while the
sleigh riders went down the hill (Tr. 149). He stated
that he saw the Egget car as they came around the
?urve. The car was backing slowly and was completely
stopped when they hit the wheel of the car (Tr. 149).
There was plenty of room to pass the car on the left and
had they leaned more on the turn, they would have missed
the car (Tr. 150).
Bruce Litster said that as they came around the
curve he saw the defendant looking out the back window
of his car and backing his car (Tr. 153). He saw the defendant turn and put on his brakes and testified that the
car was stopped at the time they hit it (Tr. 153). They
had tried to fall off the sleigh, but did not have time (Tr.
153).
He also testified that this was the first time he had
been up the Ranch Road (Tr. 154), and on the way up,
he had asked Mr. Child to let them out at a point called
"Sandy", which is the place they usually started from
(Tr. 154), and Mr. Child had said, "Why don't you come
up further and you can get a longer ride f' He stated
he knew that cars would use both the Mueller Park Road
and the Ranch Road (Tr. 157), and that the boys could
6
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not see around the curve because of an embankment and
that they had not checked the cars on the Mueller Park
Road prior to starting their ride down the hill (Tr. 158).
Darryl Richard Naisbitt testified that as he came
down the hill around the curve, he saw the car backing
up on the north side of the highway (Tr. 115), and that
Carlos had said to lean to the left so that they could
turn and that he had leaned and felt like he was going to
fall off and that was all that he reme1nbered until he woke
up some time later in the hospital (Tr. 115). He testified
that prior to the time Mr. Child took them up the hill,
they would usually start riding from a point about onethird of the way up the Mueller Park Road (Tr. 123, 124)
(See the point marked "RN" on Exhibit N). He further
testified that Seth vVilliams had made a run from the
top of the hill and timed it and that a top speed of forty
miles per hour had been obtained in the run down the hill
(Tr. 126). He stated that he knew both roads were
traveled by persons living in the area ( Tr. 128).
Upon the basis of this evidence, the court in granting
a directed verdict said:
"In giving the widest latitude that I cangiving you the benefit of all the ramifications that
you are entitled to have-from the evidence there
isn't anything in this record, in the opinion of this
court, which justifies this court submitting it to
the jury. I think the court would be derelict in
this case to jeopardize the defendant's rights in
submitting this case to a jury, so I'm going to
grant the motion for a directed verdict."

7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY
TO THE PLAINTIFF.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY
TO THE PLAINTIFF.

In the first two points of the argument in his brief,
the plaintiff and appellant makes the assertions:
(1) In order for the court to grant a request for a
directed verdict grounded on non-negligence of the defendant, the record must disclose no evidence against
the party so requesting upon which reasonable minds
could find him guilty of the negligence charged.
(2) In reviewing the evidence where the defendant
was granted a directed verdict, the court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to
determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence to
go to the jury.
We find no fault with these two pronouncements of
the law and consequently will not discuss them further.
Rather we will proceed to what we consider to be the real
issue of this case; that is, whether the defendant was
guilty of negligence which might be found by the jury
to be the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.

8
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The evidence in this case discloses a chain of circumstances, negligent or otherwise, over which the defendant
had no control, which ultimately resulted in the accident
in this case. As was stated by counsel for the defendant
in his motion for a directed verdict:

"* * * It appears affirmatively from the evidence that there was fault, negligent acts, omission or commission on the part of other persons
which entered into the cause of this accident, and
for which the defendant will not be responsible.
One is the lack of supervision the County failed
to provide at the time and place of the accident.
The failure of Seth Williams to either remain on
the job or have some one else there to supervise
it, the failure to have any supervision whatsoever
at the time and place where this accident occurred,
and it appearing that this was the first time these
boys had gone up the Ranch Road during this year,
and certainly they had never been thete to the
knowledge of the defendant. The lack of supervision here is certainly more of a legal cause for
this type of accident than trying to blame the
defendant under these conditions. There is also
the acts of conduct of Grant Child, who, knowing
the conditions then and there existihg, took these
boys up on the Ranch Road, knowing there would
be danger in coasting down the Ranch Road, and
especially where they didn't have any visibility
of the traffic on the Mueller Park Road. Then
there is also the conduct of Carlos Litster, who
was the oldest of the boys, and who was directing
the sleigh, who knew the conditions then and there
~isting, or should have known them, and the
hazards involved. So you have the acts of several
people here who entered into this thing, and all of
them that I have mentioned-in my opinion any9
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way-certainly had more to do with causing this
accident than the defendant, whose acts if anything simply furnished a condition, rather than
being an actual legal cause of the accident itself.
Then as a fourth ground, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff himself. From his own
testimony, it appeared that he knew there was
danger, yet he ran the risk of riding three deep
on the sleigh and coasting down a steep hill, where
he knew that on Mueller Park Road the speed
got up to as high as forty miles per hour, and on
the Ranch Road, where their speed was estimated
to be twenty or twenty-five per hour, which certainly was an unsafe condition in riding around
that curve on the Ranch Road with no visibility,
and where admittedly the collision would have
been avoided had the boys seen the car even a
fraction of a second sooner, or had they exercised
more care in reducing their speed or even leaning
further to the left in order to avoid the collision.
That they barely did strike the car. I think there
are many cases where a situation of this kind
exists where a car stopped on a highway, or in a
position on the highway, even though it's in movement, is nothing more than a condition and not
the actual cause of the accident itself. Not the actual legal cause."
Let us examine the acts of the defendant. Since he
lived on the road and necessarily had to travel back and
forth on Mueller Park Road to get to his home, it was not
negligent for him to be on the road. Nor was there anything negligent about the manner in which he parked his
car. He was also backing his car at the time of the accident at a very slow speed, since his brother was walking
alongside. He saw the boys coming down the hill and

10
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was therefore keeping a lookout and had completely
stopped his car at the time of the accident. The mechanical failure of the car had nothing to do with the accident
except that it might explain his being there at the particular time of the accident. Nor did his backing cause
the accident. There is no evidence that he lacked any
control over the car by reason of the backward movement
of the same that he would have had if the car had been
moving forward. The accident would have happened just
as it did had his car been faced in the opposite direction
at the same ti1ne and place.
The plaintiff and appellant cites several cases to the
effect that a person should exercise care in backing an
automobile, especially when he knows or should know that
there are children about. Again we agree with the authorities cited, but in this instance feel that they are not
applicable to this case for two reasons:
The defendant had no reason to know that there
were any children about at the time he was backing. The
evidence shows that the children usually started at a point
down the hill from the intersection of the Ranch Road,
and that the defendant had no reason to know or to believe that the children would be sleigh riding down the
Ranch Road.
(1)

(2) The defendant exercised all the care in backing
his automobile that might be expected of him assuming
that he knew or should have known that the children were
sleigh riding in the area. He was backing slowly. He was
watching to the rear of the car. He had his car under
11
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control. And lastly, he was able to stop the same within
a reasonable time upon seeing the children.
It is assumed that the defendant was negligent for
backing his vehicle on the right side of the highway, the
assertion being made that he was driving on the wrong
side of the road. We know of no law which compels such
a conclusion. Section 41-6-55 Utah Code .Annotated 1953,
provides that a vehicle shall be driven upon the right
half of the roadway with certain exceptions, none of
which are applicable here. We find no statute which
specifically states which side of the road a vehicle shall
be driven on when it is backing up. We ·will concede that
under certain circumstances, not present here, it would
be negligent to even try to back a vehicle along a highway. On the other hand, there are a number of situations
in which it is necessary to back an automobile, such as in
getting out of a parking place. Under the theory advocated here, every vehicle which attempted to back out of a
parking place would be driving on the wrong side of the
highway.
Moreover, even if we assume the vehicle was being
driven on the wrong side of the road, this was no more
a proximate cause of this accident than the fact that a
vehicle might be parked facing the wrong way on the side
of a highway is the cause of another car running into it
when so parked. Of course, it is admitted that if the defendant and his automobile had been nowhere in the
vicinity at the time of the accident, this accident would
not have occurred. Therein lies the crux of this case.
The defendant's being where he was when he was and

12
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under the circumstances then existing was not negligence,
but rather a condition but for which the accident would
not have happened.
As stated in Blashfield's Cyclopedia of .Automobile
Law and Practice, Vol. 4, Part II, page 31:
"A distinction must be drawn between the
proximate cause of an accident and a mere condition.
"The slippery condition of a street or sidewalk may be a mere condition, or a cloud of dust,
or smoke, snow, fog, mist, blinding lights or other
elements impairing vision, as well as ice and place
of parking.
"So a distinction is drawn between a wrongful
act, which is at least a contributing cause of the
injuries sued for, and one which is merely an attendant circumstance or condition, though perhaps
a necessary condition of the acts resulting in such
injury. An event may be one without which a
particular injury would not have occurred; yet,
if it was merely the condition or occasion affording opportunity for other events to produce the
injury, it is not the proximate cause thereof. • • •
"As an illustration, where plaintiff's vision
was obscured by a cloud of dust, caused when another automobile which he was following swerved
and left the paved portion of the highway to avoid
a heavily loaded and disabled wagon left on the
highway overnight by defendants, the proximate
cause of the collision between the plaintiff and the
wagon was defendant's neglect in leaving it on the
highway, in violation of a statute, and not the
cloud of dust, which was merely a. condition and
contingency which naturally would arise under

13
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the circumstances, and defendant was bound to
anticipate that it would happen."
Illustrative of this principle is the case of Blair v.
Rice, et al, (Ore.) 246 P. (2) 542. In that case the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile which skidded on
a patch of ice and struck the defendant's truck which was
parked partially on the highway. The court held that
the existence of ice constituted an intervening operation
. of a force of nature which caused the automobile in which
plaintiff was a passenger to strike the truck because it
could not be steered away from it, and the failure of
the defendants to park the truck off the highway or to
maintain a lookout or to display warning signals or to
park the truck elsewhere than in the icy patch was not
negligence. In deciding the case, the court said :
"Assuming, but not deciding, that the defendants negligently failed to maintain a lookout and
give notice that their truck was standing upon a
part of the pavement, we still do not believe that
plaintiff was entitled to recover. All of the roadway to the left of the truck was free of traffic, as
is evident from the fact that the car ahead of the
Blair car, after being hit by it, skidded safely
along the left half of the pavement. .The only
reason the Blair car ran into the truck was because
it had escaped from the control of the plaintiff's
husband and he could not steer it away from its
target. Had a flagman been present, his signals,
no matter how patent and numerous, would not
have restored the control of the skidding car to its
driver. The ice had taken charge of the situation. It constituted an 'intervening operation of
a force of nature' within a contemplation of Section 451, Restatement of the Law of Torts. ( Cita14
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tion). If the truck, instead of being motionless,
had been moving slowly upon the paved portion
of the roadway which it occupied, the collision
would, nevertheless, have occurred. Under the
circumstances, the presence of the truck must be
deemed to be a condition rather than a legal cause
of the injury;"
Turning now to authorities dealing with negligence
in situations similar to this, we find:
"If the driver does not know and has no
reasonable grounds for knowing that boys are,
or are likely to be, sliding on an intersecting street
at the tiine of passing at right angles thereto,
he is not negligent because he does not take precaution to prevent injury to a boy so sliding, if he
does what he can to avoid striking the child after
seeing his situation. Accordingly, if a motorist
comes into a collision with a sled which is coming
rapidly and not under control, and which does
not give a warning or opportunity to apprehend
its approach, he is not liable for the injuries resulting.
"vVhere a street on which coasting is permissible intersects with a street on which it is forbidden, a driver turning into the street on which
coasting is permissible has been held not to be
required in the exercise of ordinary care to anticipate that the two streets were being used as a
common coasting ground.
"In at least one jurisdiction the humanitarian
or last clear chance doctrine has been applied to
motorists injuring children playing in the street.
Under this principle, a driver is liable, notwithstanding the negligence of the boy, after seeing
the boy, or could have seen him had he used rea15
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sonable care, and realized, or could have realized,
his peril in time to avoid injuring, he failed to act
as a reasonably prudent person to avoid so doing.
"As in other situations involving injuries to
children, the drivers of motor vehicles are not
insurers against such accidents, and, if the driver
has exercised the care of a reasonably prudent
man under the circumstances, he is not liable for
injuries resulting from a collision between the
vehicle he was driving and a boy coasting in the
street." (Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, Blashfield, Page 427, Vol. 2 A.)
The action of Pennington Adm'r. v. Pure Milk Company, (Ky.) 130 S.W. (2) 24, involved the death of a
thirteen year old boy who was killed while coasting.
The accident occurred about 7:30 in the evening. Plaintiff's intestate and a group of about eight boys were
edasting down the hill in the direction from which the
defendant's truck was approaching. The truck had been
operated on the right hand side of the highway until the
driver came into view of a group of coasters. The driver
thereupon applied the brakes and. moved his truck toward the center of the roadway to miss one sled on his
north. At that moment the sled carrying the deceased
struck the truck. A verdict was directed for the defendant
by the lower court. The reviewing court said:
"It is sufficient to state that there is no show-

ing of negiigence on the part ot the appellee's
driver. Even appellant's o-wn witnesses admit that
the driver of the truck was ori his right side of the
highway until the swarm of sleds S"\yung into
view. .His acts thereafter iyere instinctive, in the
face of an emergency not of his making-an emer-
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gency at least partially attributable to appellant's
decedent. In Commonwealth v. Bowman, 267 Ky.
50, 100 S.W. (2) 801, 803, we held: 'That one meeting a sudden danger, not of his own creation, although bound to take active measures to save himself from impending harm, is not held by the law
to the same degree of judgment and activity that
he might be held were the condition otherwise.
A choice of evils or of dangerous causes may be
all that is left to a man, and he is not to be blamed
if he chooses one and not the other to escape if he
is in difficult and perilous circumstances and compelled to decide hurriedly.' "
In Praded v. McGowan, (N.H.) 190 Atl. 287, the defendant was driving his automobile in an easterly direction on a highway. On the south side of the highway a
group of children were watching for automobiles. Plaintiff, a six year old, commenced to slide down the hill toward the highway when warned by his friends of the approaching automobile. Plaintiff was unable to stop his
sled in time to avoid entering the street and colliding
with the automobile operated by the defendant. Defendant testified that he saw the group of children and
veered to the left of the roadway, but saw nothing to
indicate that a sled was coming down the hill. When he
did see the sled, he immediately applied his brakes and
brought his vehicle to a stop just at the point of collision.
On appeal, judgment was awarded to defendant. The
court pointed out that even though the defendant had
passed this particular spot about every week or so for
several weeks, this was not sufficient to charge him with
the knowledge that children were in the habit of sleigh
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riding in this area, and further, he was not negligent in
failing_ to see the boy in time to avert the accident.
In Party, et al, v. Kendall, et al, 228 N.Y.S. (2) 25,
an infant plaintiff was coasting on a sled on a very icy
hill in violation of a village ordinance. He was relying
on an eight year old boy to stand at the intersection and
warn him of approaching traffic. The infant plaintiff
knew of the danger involved at this intersection. Immediately before the collision, at a point thirty feet from the
collision, he was warned of the approach of defendant's
automobile. However, he slid into the intersection, passed
the stop sign, and the collision occurred. Plaintiff had
a verdict below, which was reversed in favor of the defendant on appeal, the court saying:
"In the light of all the circumstances and particularly the knowledge of the infant plaintiff of
the danger, we are of the opinion that he failed
to exercise the reasonable care required of him
and was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law."
In McBride, Adrnr. v. Stewart, (Iowa) 290 N.W.
700, the accident between the plaintiff who was riding
on a sled and the defendant's vehicle occurred at an intersection in the city of Eldora. The snow had melted
somewhat on the streets and evidently the more traveled
portion of the roadway was bare, but there was still snow
to the sides of the street. Plaintiff's decedent, a child of
seven years, was coasting down the street toward the
·east. Defendant was approaching in a northerly direction
on the intersecting street. The child entered the inter-
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section and struck the left rear wheel. At the close of the
evidence, defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
sustained. On appeal by plaintiff the court held:
"Turning to the record it discloses that defendant was driving twenty miles per hour in a
residential district up to the mon1ent he saw decedent coming into the intersection. He then soon
stopped, but the accident had occurred. Defendant
had all the control of his car that was incidental
to that speed. He was obRerving the street ahead
and 14th Avenue and noted that there were neither
vehicles nor pedestrians thereon. As he drove toward the intersection any vehicles or pedestrians
on Tenth Street or Fourteenth A venue would
have been readily visible and there was no obstruction of view requiring giving a signal of approaching the intersection. The testimony established the
fact that as defendant approached the intersection,
he was prevented by the snow bank from seeing
decedent as he came down the hill. The witnesses
most favorable to plaintiff stated that at a point
about twenty-five feet south of the south line of
the hill one could look up the hill and see what
was there. The evidence further shows that defendant first saw decedent just as the latter was
entering the intersection from the west, the decedent being then three or four feet out from the
south curb and two or three feet east of the east
line of the sidewalk on Tenth Street. Defendant
was then approximately even with the south edge
of the sidewalk that is located along the south side
of Fourteenth A venue.
"These facts were quite insufficient to establish that defendant was negligent in any of the
respects plaintiff specified. But plaintiff says that
there were surrounding circumstances known to
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defendant and that these determined what was
reasonable care on his part. The circumstances
were these. For many years it had been the practice of those in authority to permit children to
coast on this hill, and each time, while permission
continued, barricades were maintained on Tenth
Street at the intersection in question. There had
been coasting recently permitted, but the snow
having in a large measure melted, the barricades
had been taken down on the day before the accident and the middle portion of the paving up and
down the hill was bare of snow. Plaintiff urges
that these facts, known to defendant, imposed the
duty on him to anticipate that some child might be
coasting as decedent was doing and to be prepared
for that possibility by driving at less speed and
having better control, keeping better lookout and
sounding a warning of approach. In Webster v.
Luckow, 219 Iowa 1048, 258 N.W. 685, this court
adopted the Pennsylvania rule that a driver of an
automobile may not assume that a child under
the age of fourteen in plain view of the driver
will not move from a position of safety outside
the pathway of the vehicle and into a place of
danger in such pathway. But in connection with
so doing, the court declared itself as not holding
that such driver is under any obligation to anticipate that some child not in plain view upon the
street or public road will suddenly and unexpectedly dart out from a place of concealment
into the pathway of a driver's vehicle. To an
ordinary prude-nt person, the disappearance of
snow from the hill until it was largely bare and
the taking down of the barricades would appear
to afford assurances that the road was open to his
ordinary use. And we think it would be an assurance sufficiently dependable that he would not anticipate that a child would dart out upon a sled
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as happened in this case, despite all that appeared
to indicate to the contrary. If so, defendant's conduct was not below the usual standard of ordinary
and reasonable care. The ground that has been
discussed warranted the ruling on the motion for a
directed verdict."
In a Pennsylvania case, Covelchic v. Demo, 94 Pa.
Supra, 167, the parents of an eleven year old boy brought
an action to recover consequential damage suffered as
the result of his being struck by defendant's truck. It
appeared that the boy coasted out from a twelve foot
alley, on which there was a slight grade, and into a
twenty-seven foot wide street, and immediately upon
entering the street ran under the truck, which came from
his left, and was run over by the rear wheel. The accident occurred at dusk. The truck's lights had not been
turned on, but the street lights had, although the one
at the alley was dark, being out of repair. Plaintiffs
charged negligence as to speed, lights, failing to sound
horn in violation of certain ordinances relating to operations of automobiles at the intersection. In affirming a
judgment entered for the defendant, notwithstanding verdict for the plaintiffs, the reviewing court said:
"Even in full daylight, neither the occupant
of the sled nor the driver of the truck could see
each other until the intersection was reached, by
reason of the retaining wall around the property
on the left. This wall, about four feet high at the
corner, was on the left of the boy and the right of
the defendant as they approached the intersection.
"" "" • The only question involved on this appeal
is whether plaintiffs have sustained the burden of
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proof resting upon them to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence and that such negligence caused the injury complained of. • • • No
ordinances of the city * * * were offered in evidence and the testimony for the plaintiffs not only
fails to show that defendant's truck was operated
at an excessive rate of speed but directly negatived that charge and indicates it was stopped almost instantly after the sled ran under it. The
first and s~cond specifications of negligence
(speed and ordinance violations) may therefore
be dismissed from consideration. And taking up
the third and fourth charges of negligence we
assume * * * that defendant did not sound his
horn1 as he approached the alley and that the
lamps upon his truck were not lighted. * * * The
only possible inference from the testimony for the
plaintiffs is that this (alley) was not a place where
the drivers of vehicles on (the street in question)
might reasonably anticipate the presence of children upon sleds. It was not generally used for
coasting. * * * In our opinion there was no evidence which would legally support the finding
that the failure of the defendant to sound his
horn was under all the circumstances, a negligent
omission to perform a legal duty. The remaining
ground for recovery averred * • * is the failure
of defendant to have lamps upon his vehicle lighted. Plaintiffs offered no evidence with respect to
weather conditions or actual visibility at the time
of the occurrence."
The court then concluded that the trial judge was
warranted in taking judicial notice of the time of sunset,
and the evidence was that the accident occurred less than
an hour after sunset, lights not therefore being required
by statute.
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Thus we see that an act may be necessary to the
happening of an accident; that is, a condition without
which the accident would not have happened, and yet not
be the legal cause of the accident. In this case, the defendant was not guilty of any wrongful act which was a
legal cause of the accident. He was driving very slowly.
He was maintaining a proper lookout and saw the boys
and immediately stopped his car before the collision. He
had no reason to expect the boys to be sleigh riding in
that area and to come around the curve in question, that
not being a place where the boys were permitted to or
usually coasted, but even if we assume that he did know
or should have known, it is not seen how he could have
been more careful.

CONCLUSION
The accident itself in this case and the resulting injuries to the plaintiff was brought about by the operation
of a number of factors over which the defendant had
no control. The County may have been negligent in failing to provide adequate supervision of the sleigh riding
on the hill. Seth Williams, the person who was designated to take care of the hill, may have been negligent in
leaving and going home when the boys were sleigh riding. Grant Adams Child was surely negligent in taking
the boys up on the Ranch Road to sleigh ride, where
sleigh riding had never been permitted before, especially
when the boys themselves knew this and protested and
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requested to be let out on that part of the hill from which
they usually started. The boys themselves knew that they
were not permitted to sleigh ride on the area in question.
They knew that automobiles would be traveling back and
forth upon the Mueller Park Road, as well as the Ranch
Road. They were aware of the fact that they could not
see around the curve and they were also aware of the high
speeds which were attained by sleds in going down this
hill. Whether or not they could be found guilty of contributory negligence, we cannot overlook the fact that their
own acts and omissions, negligent or otherwise, were the
immediate proximate cause of this accident. Unless we
are prepared to hold that the defendant was negligent in
even being in the area, which, of course, is not warranted,
we can find no culpable action on his part. IIe had no
reason to know that the boys were sleigh riding in the
area, yet, he could not have exercised any greater caution
had he known. He was driving his automobile very slowly, observing a proper lookout, and was able to stop the
automobile immediately upon seeing the boys before the
collision. The boys themselves were going so fast that
they could neither turn, nor get off of the sleigh fast
enough to avoid the collision, even though they saw the
automobile when they were a considerable distance from
it.
The most that can be said for the defendant's presence in the area at the time and under the existing circumstances is that his presence was a condition without
which this accident would not have happened, but was
not the legal cause of the accident, which would have
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occurred in spite of and not on account of any negligence
of which he was alleged to be guilty.
Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
and DON J. HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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